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This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences a⁄ects players￿equilibrium
behavior in both the one-shot and the in￿nitely repeated version of the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game.
We show that fairness concerns operate as a ￿substitute￿for time discounting in the in￿nitely
repeated game, as fairness helps sustain cooperation for lower discount factors. In addition,
such cooperation can be supported under larger parameter values if players are informed about
each others￿social preferences than if they are uninformed. Finally, our results help to identify
conditions under which cooperative behavior observed in recent experimental repeated games
can be rationalized using time preferences alone (patience) or a combination of time and social
preferences (fairness)
Keywords: Prisoner￿ s dilemma; Repeated games; Inequity aversion; Time discounting,
Social Preferences.
JEL classification: C72, C73, H43, D91.1 Introduction
Inspired by a large volume of experimental evidence, there has been much recent work on social, as
opposed to individual, preferences re￿ ecting individuals￿concern for fairness in the income distri-
bution; see for instance, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Much of this
literature has examined how such social preferences might facilitate cooperation among individuals
who interact in sequential move, strategic environments, such as worker-employee, principal-agent
or investor-trustee relationships. However, there has been comparatively little application of social
preferences to simultaneous-move games, and in particular, to in￿nitely repeated versions of those
games.1
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating how social preferences might facilitate
cooperation among players interacting in the canonical simultaneous-move game ￿ the Prisoner￿ s
Dilemma￿which is appropriate for the study of strategic environments with extreme competitive
incentives.2 Surprisingly, we have found no literature exploring the e⁄ects of social preferences in
in￿nitely repeated games.3 We analyze the interaction between time and social preferences, and
provide conditions under which observed cooperation in experimental settings can be explained
using either social or time preferences alone, or a combination of both types of preferences.
We ￿rst show that by introducing social preferences into a one-shot Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game we
can rationalize mutual cooperation in equilibrium, but only when both players assign a su¢ ciently
high value to other individuals￿payo⁄s. We then show in the in￿nitely repeated version of the
game, how social preferences work as a ￿substitute￿for time preferences (discounting) since higher
concerns about fairness reduce the minimum discount factor necessary to support cooperative
outcomes in the repeated game. Our results help to rationalize experimental observations where
players cooperate under relatively low discount factors ￿ values for which the ￿Folk theorem￿for
repeated games would not predict cooperation.
In addition, we investigate how equilibrium play is a⁄ected by the introduction of incomplete
information about players￿social preferences. We begin by analyzing a signaling version of the twice-
repeated prisoner￿ s dilemma game in which the player who is informed about his type (concern for
fairness) uses ￿rst-period actions to convey or conceal his social preferences to the uninformed
player. We identify a pooling equilibrium in which the informed player cooperates in the ￿rst
period of the game regardless of his type. The unconcerned player chooses to cooperate, in order
to ￿mislead￿the uninformed player about his true type. If priors about types are su¢ ciently high,
1See however, Fischbacher and G￿chter (2010) who use a strategy method to ￿nd direct evidence of social pref-
erences in a linear voluntary contribution experiment that involves simultaneous decisions by groups of four players
interacting repeatedly for a ￿nite number of periods (no discounting).
2Note that the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game is strategically equivalent to a voluntary contribution or ￿public good￿
game with a ￿nite set of actions. Thus, all our analysis is also applicable to this public good game as well. In the
last section of the paper, we extend our results to a larger class of games.
3Montero (2007) introduces inequity aversion in the Baron and Forejohn (1989) legislative bargaining game,
showing that individuals￿social preferences might actually lead to more inequality. Intuitively, during the bargaining
process the responder experiences a greater disutility from being left outside the winning coalition when he is envious
than when he is not, which induces him to accept lower o⁄ers thereby increasing payo⁄ inequality. In our model
there is no such risk, which eliminates the possibility of this kind of result.
1this misleading strategy induces the uninformed player to cooperate in the subsequent period,
while informed players who are unconcerned about fairness defect in the second and ￿nal period.4
Interestingly, this pooling equilibrium provides an explanation for a relatively common observation
in experimental settings wherein subjects defect in the last period of interaction, despite a previous
history of cooperation.5 We then extend our analysis to in￿nitely repeated games with incomplete
information, where we show that cooperation becomes more di¢ cult to support relative to the case
of complete information.
Finally, we analyze the set of feasible, individually rational payo⁄s that can be achieved when
playing the in￿nitely repeated game and we examine how this set is a⁄ected by changes in players￿
social preferences.6 In particular, we ￿nd that the set of feasible, individually rational payo⁄s
shrinks as individuals become more concerned about fairness.7 Interestingly, this implies a potential
confusion in the experimental literature on the source of observed cooperation on repeated games.
Indeed, it suggests that such cooperation may not be due to players￿high discount factors alone,
but could instead arise from a combination of individuals￿time and social preferences. We suggest
a method for inferring whether the mechanism supporting cooperative behavior in the in￿nitely
repeated game can be explained using time preferences alone or when reliance must be placed on
both time and social preferences in order to rationalize cooperative play.
Related literature. Our results are related to those in Kreps et al. (1982), who consider the
role of informational asymmetries about players￿types in the ￿nitely repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma
game. Speci￿cally, in their model a ￿rational￿player may assign some probability to the possibil-
ity that his opponent ￿irrationally￿plays a conditionally cooperative, tit-for-tat strategy, showing
that there is a sequential equilibrium of the ￿nitely repeated game in which the ￿rational￿player
imitates the ￿irrational￿player by also playing tit-for-tat. Similarly, in this paper, we demonstrate
that the existence of social preferences may lead to cooperation among players in situations where
cooperation would not exist among self-interested players. However, we develop our result from
4Healy (2007) identi￿es a similar result in the context of ￿nitely-repeated gift-exchange games where the ￿rm
manager does not observe the worker￿ s type (either reciprocator or sel￿sh). The equilibrium in which informed
players ￿mislead￿ uninformed players can, nonetheless, be supported under di⁄erent parameter conditions in the
simultaneous and sequential versions of the game. Du⁄y and Munoz-Garcia (2011) elaborate on this di⁄erence.
5See for instance, Selten and Stoecker (1986) and Andreoni and Miller (1993) for the prisoner￿ s dilemma game,
McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) for the centipede game, Camerer and Weigelt (1988), Brandts and Figueras (2003) for the
borrower-lender game, and Anderhub, Engelmann and G￿th (2002) for the ￿nitely-repeated trust game. Importantly,
this informational explanation for cooperative behavior is quite distinct from bounded rationality arguments in which
some players misunderstand strategic incentives.
6In this sense, our paper is also related to Rabin (1997), who analyzes the introduction of concerns about fairness
in ￿nitely repeated games under complete information. Similarly to Rabin (1997), we ￿nd that players￿preferences
for fairness facilitate their coordination to play equilibrium outcomes with Pareto superior payo⁄s. However, Rabin￿ s
(1997) results can only be supported when the per-period payo⁄s are negligible, and he does not investigate the
substitutability between social and temporal preferences.
7This result provides an e⁄ect opposite to that shown by Abreu et al. (1990), wherein the set of equilibrium payo⁄s
in the in￿nitely repeated game weakly increases with increases in the discount factor. Chade et al. (2008) present a
result in line with that in our paper for hyperbolic (present-biased) preferences where, in the case of the Prisoner￿ s
Dilemma game, an increase in players￿discount factor expands the set of equilibrium payo⁄s whereas an increase in
players￿hyperbolic preferences shrinks this set. Similarly, Yamamoto (2010) demonstrates that the set of equilibrium
payo⁄s does not necessarily expand in the discount factor if players cannot observe a public randomization.
2a simpler, behavioral primitive ￿ social preferences, speci￿cally inequity aversion￿ which is sup-
ported by strong empirical evidence; see for instance, Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) or Camerer
(2003).8 Further, we also develop our result in the in￿nitely repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game
(Kreps et al. (1982) only study the ￿nitely repeated version), and we relate fairness concerns
to time preferences. The study of cooperation in in￿nitely repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma games
has recently become the subject of much study by experimentalists (see, among others, Dal B￿
(2005), Normann and Wallace (2006), Aoyagi and FrØchette (2009), Du⁄y and Ochs (2009), Cam-
era and Casari (2009) and Dal B￿ and FrØchette (2011), Blonski et al. (2011) and Fudenberg et
al. (2012)) and so an understanding of the mechanisms by which cooperation can be sustained in
such environments is both important and timely.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model. Section three
then analyzes equilibrium behavior under complete information, while section four extends our
results to incomplete information contexts. Similarly, section ￿ve extends our analysis to more
general simultaneous-move games ￿ including games with asymmetric payo⁄ structures￿ and to a
more general class of social preferences. Section six elaborates on the set of feasible payo⁄s and the
potential confound we might observe between social and time preferences under certain parameter
values. Section seven concludes.
2 Model
Consider the stage game shown below. To make this a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game, both players￿
payo⁄s must satisfy the restriction b > a > d > c. In that case, both players￿best response in the
one-shot game is to choose D, ￿defect,￿either when the other player chooses C, ￿cooperate￿(given
that b > a), or when the other player defects as well (since d > c). Hence, the strategy pro￿le
(D,D) is the unique equilibrium of the one-shot stage game.
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C a,a c,b
D b,c d,d
In this paper, however, we analyze players who possess Fehr and Schmidt (1999)-type social
preferences, a now standard speci￿cation. (Section 5 extends our results to other social preferences).
For the case of two players, Fehr and Schmidt￿ s (1999) utility function reduces to:
Ui(xi;xj) = xi ￿ ￿i maxfxj ￿ xi;0g ￿ ￿i maxfxi ￿ xj;0g;
8The term ￿social preferences￿ encompasses several di⁄erent formulations, besides inequity aversion including
preferences for reciprocity, unconditional kindness (altruism) and spiteful preferences; see for instance, Fehr and
Fischbacher (2002). By ￿social preferences￿we will mean inequity aversion as in the formulation of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999).
3where xi is player i￿ s payo⁄, and xj is the payo⁄ of his opponent (player j). The parameter ￿i
represents the disutility from allocations that are disadvantageously unequal for player i due to
envy about player j￿ s higher payo⁄, while the parameter ￿i captures the disutility from allocations
that are advantageously unequal for player i due to guilt over earning a higher payo⁄ than player
j. Additionally, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that players￿envy is always stronger than their
guilt. We capture this by assuming that ￿i ￿ ￿i and 1 > ￿i ￿ 0.9 We will contrast this case of
￿social preferences￿(which we also refer to throughout as ￿concerns for fairness￿ ) with the more
standard, self-regarding preferences where ￿i = ￿i = 0 for all i.
Taking social preferences into account, the stage game can be reformulated as follows:
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C a;a c ￿ ￿1(b ￿ c);b ￿ ￿2(b ￿ c)
D b ￿ ￿1(b ￿ c);c ￿ ￿2(b ￿ c) d,d
Notice in particular, that every player i￿ s utility level decreases when he is either: the player with
the highest payo⁄ in the group (due to guilt), e.g., player 1 under outcome (D,C), or when he is
the player with the lowest payo⁄ in the group (due to envy), e.g., player 1 under outcome (C,D).
3 Complete information about social preferences
3.1 Stage game
In this section we brie￿ y analyze equilibrium behavior in the one-shot Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game
under the assumption of complete information about social preferences. Section 3.2 examines
players￿equilibrium strategies in the in￿nitely repeated version of the game, whereas section 4
focuses on the incomplete information game.
Lemma 1. In the one-shot Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game where players have social preferences
(￿i > ￿i ￿ 0), the following strategy pro￿les can be supported as Nash equilibria of the game:
1. (D,D), if ￿i ￿ b￿a
b￿c for any player; and
2. (C,C), (D,D) and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where every player i randomizes according
to probability q(￿j;￿j) =
d￿c+￿j(b￿c)
a+d￿c￿b+(￿j+￿j)(b￿c) if ￿i > b￿a
b￿c for both players.
Hence, if at least one player has relatively low concerns about guilt, the unique Nash equilibrium
9Intuitively, ￿i ￿ ￿i implies that players (weakly) su⁄er more from inequality directed at them than inequality
directed at others. On the other hand, ￿i ￿ 0 means that players dislike being better o⁄ than others (this assumption
rules out cases in which individuals are status seekers but serves to simplify the analysis). Finally, ￿i < 1 suggests
that when player i￿ s payo⁄ is higher than that of player j￿ s by one unit (e.g. a dollar), player i is never willing to
give up more than one unit in order to reduce this inequality. For a more detailed explanation of these assumptions,
see Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
4of the one-shot game, (D,D), coincides with that of the one-shot game where players have no






















Figure 1. Equilibria in the simultaneous game
under complete information.
However, when both individuals are su¢ ciently concerned about fairness ￿ the shaded area of
Figure 1￿ we can identify three di⁄erent Nash equilibria: one in which both players defect, one
in which both players cooperate, and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.10 The introduction of
su¢ cient concerns about fairness by both players thus transforms the payo⁄ structure of the game
from a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma to a Pareto-rankable coordination game.11
3.2 In￿nitely repeated game
Let us now focus on equilibrium strategies in the in￿nitely repeated version of the Prisoner￿ s
Dilemma game under social preferences and complete information.12 We consider that every player
i discounts future payo⁄s according to a discount factor 0 < ￿i < 1.
Proposition 1. In the in￿nitely repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game where players have con-
10Note that ￿j >
b￿a
b￿c is a su¢ cient condition for probability cuto⁄ q(￿j;￿j) to satisfy q(￿j;￿j) 2 (0;1).
11In particular, every player￿ s best response is to select the same action as his opponent, but both players strictly
prefer (C,C) to (D,D). Note that this best response function is similar to what Cooper et al. (1996) call ￿best response
altruists,￿namely players for whom cooperate (defect) is their best response to cooperation (defection, respectively),
as opposed to what Cooper et al. (1996) refer to as ￿dominant strategy altruists￿for whom cooperation is always
a best response, regardless of other players￿strategies. Our results in the unrepeated game are also connected with
those in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), who allow for every individual￿ s payo⁄ thresholds to be private information.
Unlike our model, however, their paper does not explicitly consider in￿nitely repeated games, and how equilibrium
predictions in such a setting di⁄er when players are symmetrically or asymmetrically informed about each others￿
social preferences.
12For simplicity, we focus on the case in which players￿concerns for fairness are not extreme, i.e., ￿i;￿i <
b￿d
b￿c for
all player i. In particular, this guarantees that the utility from reverting to the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the
stage game is still lower than that from playing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
5cerns for fairness (￿F￿or ￿i > 0), mutual cooperation can be sustained as the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE) of the in￿nitely repeated game by use of the following grim-trigger strategy by
every player i: start cooperating in the ￿rst period of the game, and cooperate as long as all players














b￿d denotes the minimal discount factor supporting cooperation in the in￿nitely repeated
















Figure 2. Discount factors ￿F
i (￿i) and ￿NF
i .
Figure 2 provides an illustration of how the minimum discount factor supporting mutual co-
operation in the in￿nitely repeated game when players have concerns for fairness, ￿F
i (￿i), varies
with ￿i. To facilitate comparison, Figure 2 also includes the discount factor sustaining cooperation
in the in￿nitely repeated game in the case where players are not concerned about fairness, ￿NF
i .
Notice that when players do not assign any value to fairness (when ￿i = 0, at the vertical intercept
of Figure 2), the minimal discount factors necessary to support mutual cooperation, ￿F
i (￿i) and
￿NF
i coincide. For strictly positive values of ￿i, Figure 2 can be divided into two regions. First, for
relatively low concerns about fairness, ￿i ￿ b￿a
b￿c, every player has incentives to unilaterally deviate
from the cooperative outcome since b￿￿i(b￿c) ￿ a, as in the standard Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game.
Each player￿ s incentive to deviate is, however, reduced by the guilt he experiences from obtaining a
higher payo⁄ than other players, ￿i(b￿c). This result is illustrated by the fact that ￿F
i (￿i) ￿ ￿NF
i
and that ￿F
i (￿i) decreases in ￿i. Mutual cooperation can then be sustained under a broader set
of parameter values when players possess social preferences than when they do not. For relatively
high concerns about fairness, ￿i > b￿a
b￿c, players have no incentives to unilaterally deviate from the
6cooperative outcome since a > b ￿ ￿i(b ￿ c), which implies that cooperation can now be sustained
for all discount factors, as illustrated in Figure 2 for ￿i > b￿a
b￿c.
Hence, players￿concerns about fairness make the Folk theorem for repeated games with dis-
counting (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)) applicable under a broader range of parameter
values (discount factors).13 This result can help to explain experimental ￿ndings such as those re-
ported by Murnighan and Roth (1983, Table 4), Dal B￿ (2005, Table 5) and Dal B￿ and FrØchette
(2011, Tables 3-4) where a small but signi￿cant fraction of experimental subjects playing an in-
de￿nitely repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game are observed to cooperate even when continuation
probabilities (induced discount factors) do not support such cooperation as an equilibrium of the
repeated game under standard, self-interested preferences. Our result showing that fairness con-
cerns may ￿substitute￿for patience can be used to rationalize such experimental observations.14
Section six discusses how to disentangle time and social preferences as mechanisms for sustaining
cooperation in experimental settings.
4 Incomplete information about social preferences
4.1 Signaling private concerns about fairness
In this section we relax the assumption of complete information about social preferences. We
use a standard signaling game information structure in which one player￿ s social preferences are
commonly known while the other ￿informed￿player￿ s social preferences are his private information,
i.e., we study the case of one-sided asymmetric information. Speci￿cally, suppose that nature selects
player i￿ s concern for fairness, ￿i, either ￿H
i with probability q, or ￿L




i ￿ 0, and such realization is the private information of player i only. If an informed
player i has ￿i = ￿H
i (￿i = ￿L
i ) we refer to him as the ￿concerned￿(￿unconcerned,￿respectively)
player. Note that we allow for ￿L
i = 0. By contrast, player j￿ s guilt parameter, ￿j, is common
knowledge for both players and ￿j > b￿a
b￿c.15 In order to focus on the possibility that player i
signals his guilt concern, ￿i, to the uninformed player j, let us assume that both individuals￿envy
concerns, ￿i and ￿j, are also common knowledge. Hence, player i holds private information about
his guilt parameter ￿i alone, since the precise value of ￿i, either high ￿i = ￿H






i , is common knowledge.
Du⁄y and Munoz-Garcia (2011) describe equilibrium behavior in the twice-repeated game with
one-sided asymmetric information among players. Speci￿cally, separating strategy pro￿les cannot
be supported as Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the signaling game for any prior q, whereas
13Mutual cooperation can also be supported as the SPNE of the in￿nitely repeated game by the use of other type
of strategies, such as those in which defection is punished only during a limited number of time periods, or other
reciprocal strategies like ￿tit-for-tat.￿In this section, we focus for simplicity in one type of strategy in order to analyze
how social preferences can work as substitute for temporal preferences.
14Other potential explanation of this observed behavior could include incomplete information among the players
or learning.
15Otherwise, player j would ￿nd defection to be a dominant strategy in the second period simultaneous-move game,
and the ￿rst-period player i￿ s actions would not a⁄ect his opponent￿ s future play.
7a pooling strategy pro￿le can be sustained as a PBE in which both types of informed player i
cooperate in the ￿rst period if priors are su¢ ciently high q ￿ q(￿j;￿j).16 The uninformed player
j cooperates both in the ￿rst period (given the relatively high prior) and in the second period,
conditional on observing that player i cooperated in the ￿rst stage. Hence, by cooperating in the
￿rst period, the highly concerned player i guarantees outcome (C,C) in the second period of the
game. In contrast, the unconcerned player i ￿disguises￿ himself as a player with high concerns
for fairness who will cooperate in the following period. This misleading strategy induces player
j to cooperate in the second period, where the unconcerned player i takes the opportunity to
defect, yielding outcome (D,C). This ￿backstabbing￿result might account for observed behavior
in experimental settings, as in the literature suggested in the introduction, where subjects initially
cooperate but choose to defect in the ￿nal period of the repeated game.
4.2 Repeated game under incomplete information
We next analyze the in￿nitely repeated version of the incomplete information game described
in the previous section with discounting of future payo⁄s, i.e., player i￿ s discount factor is ￿i 2
(0;1). Unlike in the previous section, we now allow for two-sided asymmetric information about
guilt parameters, i.e., every player i￿ s guilt is either ￿i = ￿H
i > b￿a
b￿c with probability qi 2 (0;1)
or ￿i = ￿L
i < b￿a
b￿c with probability 1 ￿ qi. We further assume that it is common knowledge
that ￿i = ￿j = ￿, and that player i￿ s and j￿ s discount factors are ￿i and ￿j, entailing that
the only element of uncertainty that a given player faces is his opponent￿ s guilt parameter. Let
us consider the case in which ￿rst-period actions transmit valuable information about a player￿ s
concern for fairness by examining the strategy pro￿le where players cooperate during the ￿rst
period of the game if and only if their discount factor is su¢ ciently high.17 Following the ￿rst
period of the game, players observe payo⁄s which allow them to perfectly infer the true type of their
opponent. Incomplete information thus plays a role during the ￿rst period of the game alone, since
in all subsequent periods, players￿concerns for fairness are perfectly inferred from their ￿rst-period
actions.18 Furthermore, this information allows every player to predict whether his opponent will
16Since players interact during only two periods, we consider no discounting. In addition, note that we use ￿pooling￿
equilibrium to refer to strategy pro￿les in which both types of player i cooperate during the ￿rst-period game. In
particular, Du⁄y and Munoz-Garcia (2011) show that cuto⁄ q(￿j;￿j) is q(￿j;￿j) =
d￿c+￿j(b￿c)
a+d￿c￿b+(￿j+￿j)(b￿c). For
robustness, the authors also show that this pooling equilibrium survives the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion.
17If, in contrast, both players select cooperate or both select defect during the ￿rst period of the game, then ￿rst-
period actions do not communicate information about player i￿ s type. In such cases, every player￿ s period payo⁄s
would not depend on the other player￿ s type, and the introduction of incomplete information would not substantially
modify our complete information analysis.
18We assume that every player compares his stage game payo⁄ at every time period with that of his opponent, in
order to evaluate the disutility from envy or guilt. Such information is typically available to subjects in experimental
studies of inde￿nitely repeate games. Oechssler (2011) has recently proposed an alternative approach to incorporating
social preferences into ￿nitely repeated games where players compare their own discounted aggregate payo⁄ at the
end of the game with that of their opponent under complete informaiton. By contrast, under incomplete information
our period-by period approach allows for dynamic strategies to arise due to the inequality that individuals experience
over the course of the game. The alternative approach where player compare payo⁄ at the end of the repeated
game only allows for the emergence of dynamic strategies across supergames. We therefore prefer our approach of
comparing invidual payo⁄s period-by-period.
8cooperate in the continuation game. In particular, if player i￿ s discount factor ￿i is su¢ ciently high,
i.e., if ￿i ￿ ￿F(￿L
i ) ￿ ￿F(￿H
i ), then player i cooperates in the continuation game both when ￿i = ￿L
i
and when ￿i = ￿H
i . Similarly, if player i￿ s discount factor is su¢ ciently low, he defects regardless of
his type, i.e., when ￿F(￿L
i ) ￿ ￿F(￿H
i ) > ￿i. If, instead, player i￿ s discount factor is intermediate, he
cooperates when he has high concerns for fairness, ￿i ￿ ￿F(￿H
i ), but defects otherwise, ￿F(￿L
i ) > ￿i,
i.e., ￿F(￿L
i ) > ￿i ￿ ￿F(￿H
i ). In the ￿rst two cases there is no information transmission from ￿rst-
period actions since all player types either cooperate or defect in the continuation game. By
contrast, in the third case, ￿rst-period actions can communicate information about the players￿
type. Therefore, we focus on the latter case where ￿F(￿L
i ) > ￿i ￿ ￿F(￿H
i ).
Proposition 2. In the in￿nitely repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game with two-sided uncertainty,
the following strategy pro￿le can be supported as a PBE of the game:
1. In the ￿rst period play of the stage game, every player i cooperates when his guilt parameter
is high, ￿i = ￿H
i , but defects when his guilt parameter is low, ￿i = ￿L
i , if and only if his
discount factor, ￿i; satis￿es ￿UF
i (￿;￿L




i (￿;￿i) ￿ 1 +
(d ￿ a)qj
d ￿ c + qj(b + c ￿ 2d) ￿ (b ￿ c)[qj￿i + (qj ￿ 1)￿]
for any ￿i = f￿L
i ;￿H
i g
2. In subsequent period plays of the stage game, every player i cooperates if and only if all players
cooperated in all prior periods for any discount factor ￿i ￿ ￿F
i (￿H
i ) when his guilt parameter
is high, ￿i = ￿H
i , and for any discount factor ￿i ￿ ￿F
i (￿L




i (￿;￿i) is decreasing in guilt aversion, ￿i, but is increasing in envy aversion,
￿. Furthermore, ￿UF
i (￿;￿i) ￿ ￿F
i (￿i) for any ￿i = f￿L
i ;￿H
i g; ￿UF
i (￿;￿i) = ￿F
i (￿i) as qj ! 1, and
￿UF
i (￿;￿i) = 1 as qj ! 0.
As suggested above, this strategy pro￿le prescribes that every player i starts cooperating if
his discount factor is su¢ ciently high, ￿i ￿ ￿UF
i (￿;￿i), and continues cooperating as long as his
opponent has cooperated in the past. Otherwise, players revert to defection thereafter. Two points
are noteworthy.
First, the minimum discount factor supporting cooperation ￿UF
i (￿;￿i) is decreasing in ￿i,
con￿rming the ￿substitutability￿ between time preferences and guilt found earlier for the com-
plete information version of the in￿nitely repeated game. However, the minimum discount factor,
￿UF
i (￿;￿i); is now increasing in ￿. Intuitively, larger concerns about envy raise the minimum
discount factor needed to sustain cooperation during the ￿rst stage of the game. Speci￿cally, un-
der incomplete information about fairness concerns, players face the possibility that his opponent
does not cooperate during that ￿rst stage, reducing the equilibrium payo⁄ of the former from a to
c ￿ ￿i(b ￿ c).
9Second, the minimum discount factor inducing an uninformed player to cooperate in the ￿rst
period, ￿UF
i (￿;￿i), is higher (more demanding) than under complete information, ￿F
i (￿i). As
the probability of facing a cooperative player j tends to zero, qj ! 0, player i￿ s minimum discount
factor supporting cooperation approaches one, indicating that cooperation is very unlikely to occur.
This minimum discount factor is decreasing in qj, and approaches the minimum discount factor
for the complete information environment, ￿F
i (￿i), when the probability of facing a cooperative
opponent approaches one, i.e., qj ! 1. Finally, note that the results in Proposition 2 about two-
sided asymmetric information embody one-sided asymmetric information as a special case, where
qj = 1 while qi 2 (0;1). In this context, player j is uninformed about player i￿ s type but player i
observes ￿j = ￿H
j , entailing that player j cooperates in the ￿rst period of the in￿nitely repeated
game if his discount factor ￿j satis￿es ￿UF
j (￿;￿L
j ) > ￿j ￿ ￿UF
j (￿;￿H
j ) since he is still uninformed






> ￿i ￿ ￿F
i (￿H
i ) given
that he is informed.
5 Extension to more general games and preferences
In this section we analyze equilibrium strategies in a more general class of in￿nitely repeated
games. In particular, we consider simultaneous-move games with complete information and a ￿nite
number of players and actions. For simplicity, we restrict attention to games where players can
choose cooperative action choices that improve their per-period payo⁄s relative to those in the
Nash equilibrium of the stage game which we denote by e xi.19 That is, we consider games where
there exists an action pro￿le a = (ai;a￿i) with payo⁄ Ui(ai;a￿i) = xi, where xi > e xi, for every
player i.20 When players do not assign a value to fairness, i.e., ￿i = ￿i = 0; mutual cooperation
can be sustained as a SPNE of the in￿nitely repeated game for any discount factor ￿i such that
￿i ￿ ￿NF
i for all i; see, e.g., Friedman (1971). Similarly, as we have shown, when players with social
preferences assign a value to fairness, mutual cooperation can be supported for any discount factor
￿i such that ￿i ￿ ￿F
i (￿i). This section examines the conditions for which ￿F
i (￿i) ￿ ￿NF
i , i.e., that
cooperation can be supported under a larger set of parameter values when players are concerned
about fairness than when they are not.
We begin by de￿ning a ￿weak symmetry￿condition that we will make use of in Proposition 3
below. Speci￿cally, a game satis￿es ￿weak symmetry￿if and only if all players￿payo⁄s coincide
when they play the Nash equilibrium of the stage game, i.e., e xi = e xj, as well as when they play
the cooperative outcome in the repeated game, xi = xj. For instance, in the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma
19Similar to previous sections, we focus on the case in which players are not extremely concerned about social
preferences, so that the utility from the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game is higher than that from
the mixed strategy equilibrium of the stage game. As a consequence, minmax payo⁄s when players are concerned
about fairness coincide with those when players are not concerned. For simplicity, we consider the existence of a
unique Nash equilibrium in the stage game. Our results can be extended to stage games with multiple Nash equilibria,
and use e xi to denote the payo⁄ that individuals obtain in the Nash equilibrium providing the highest payo⁄.
20For simplicity, we assume that payo⁄ Ui(ai;a￿i) = xi can be achieved using pure strategies. Otherwise, one can
suppose that any randomization producing payo⁄ xi is publicly observed by all players, thus allowing deviations to
be detected by every player.
10game, this weak symmetry assumption implies that players 1 and 2 earn the same payo⁄ when
they both choose to defect and when they both choose to cooperate. Hence, if both individuals￿
payo⁄s coincide under these two strategy pro￿les, then utility levels when players are concerned
about fairness will not be diminished (since there is no inequality in the payo⁄ distribution). Note
that weak symmetry is not as restrictive as stronger forms of symmetry, whereby player i￿ s payo⁄
coincides with that of player j at every strategy pro￿le.
Proposition 3. If the stage game￿ s payo⁄ structure satis￿es the weak symmetry condition,
then ￿F
i (￿i) ￿ ￿NF
i holds for all parameter values, ￿i and ￿i. Otherwise, ￿F
i (￿i) ￿ ￿NF
i if and only
if
maxai Ui (a) ￿ xi
maxai Ui (a) ￿ e xi
￿
maxai UF
i (a) ￿ xF
i
maxai UF
i (a) ￿ e xi
F .
This result con￿rms our previous intuition from the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game: cooperation can
be supported for weakly broader conditions when players are concerned about fairness than when
they are not. In particular, when the game is weakly symmetric in players￿payo⁄s, and players
are concerned about fairness, their utility from deviating is reduced by the guilt they experience
from being the player with the higher payo⁄. Importantly, this result can be applied to many
simultaneous-move games besides the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game, including voluntary contribution
(public good) games, and coordination games. By contrast, when the game does not satisfy the weak
symmetry condition, cooperative outcomes can be supported with a weakly lower discount factor
only if the above condition is satis￿ed. Intuitively, this condition holds if a player￿ s incentives to
deviate from the cooperative outcome are relatively stronger when he is unconcerned about fairness
than otherwise. The following corollary shows that the result of Proposition 3 can be extended to
players with social preferences di⁄erent from those in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
Corollary 1. The result from Proposition 3, ￿F
i (￿i) ￿ ￿NF
i , holds both under linear and non-
linear social preferences.
Proposition 3 therefore holds not only for the linear, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) speci￿cation of
social preferences, where every unit of payo⁄ inequality induces the same disutility (either in the
form of envy or guilt), but also for more general (possibly non-linear) social preferences, such as
those suggested by Neilson (2006):




where u is any continuous function of the level of payo⁄ inequality, xi ￿ xj, and ￿i is player i￿ s
sensitivity to such payo⁄ inequality. Speci￿cally, we can assume that u is increasing in xi ￿ xj
whenever xi > xj, i.e., individuals experience a disutility (guilt) from receiving a higher payo⁄
relative to other players in the population. Further, the disutility from guilt can be either increasing
11in payo⁄ inequality (if u is a convex function), or decreasing in payo⁄ inequality (if u is a concave
function). Our results are thus applicable to players with relatively general social preferences.
6 Feasible and individually rational payo⁄s
Let us ￿nally examine how our previous results translate into the set of feasible payo⁄s for the
in￿nitely repeated game. For simplicity, we focus on the two-player Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game.
Figure 3(a) below represents the set of feasible payo⁄s for the case where individuals do not assign
any value to fairness considerations, ￿i = 0, i.e., payo⁄ pairs within the quadrilateral with vertices
(a,a), (b,c), (d,d) and (c,b).21 Let us denote this set of feasible payo⁄s by FPNF, where, as before,
the subscript NF denotes that players are not concerned about fairness. Formally, the set of feasible
payo⁄s is de￿ned as the convex hull of all payo⁄s x 2 R2
+ feasible under the set of available actions
a 2 A, i.e., FP =convex hull fx jthere exists a 2 A such that U(a) = xg.
Figure 3(a). Set of feasible payo⁄s. Figure 3(b). Individually rational payo⁄s.
Figure 3(b), additionally, shades the set of feasible payo⁄s that are individually rational, i.e.,
all those payo⁄s such that xi > b xi for both players, where b xi is the reservation utility (or minmax







. Hence, the shaded area in Figure 3(b) depicts the set of feasible,
individually rational payo⁄s, where the minmax payo⁄ pair is (d;d).
Let us now analyze how the feasible set is a⁄ected as players￿concerns about fairness increase.
In particular, Figure 4 below illustrates sets of feasible payo⁄s for players with positive concerns
about fairness, ￿i > 0, and compares those with the set of feasible payo⁄s for a player who assigns
no value to fairness, FPNF.
21For simplicity, Figures 3ab consider the case where d <
b+c
2 < a. We would obtain similar ￿gures under alternative
parametric restrictions.
12Figure 4. Set of feasible payo⁄s for ￿i > 0:
Figure 4 reveals that as fairness concerns increase, the set of feasible payo⁄s shrinks like a fan
closing its arms along the main diagonal, with its end at the pair of payo⁄s resulting from mutual
cooperation, (a;a). Speci￿cally, the blue set (long-dash) of feasible payo⁄s, FP1, illustrates players





. Further increases in fairness concerns







Note that at FP1 defection is still a best response to cooperation. At FP2, however, cooperation
becomes a best response to cooperation.
Next, for the FP2 set of feasible payo⁄s illustrated in Figure 4, Figure 5 below shades the portion
of that set representing feasible and individually rational ￿ FIR￿payo⁄s. (Other FIR sets given FP
sets are constructed similarly). Notice ￿rst that the FIR payo⁄s when players are concerned about
fairness are not simply the payo⁄s to the northeast of the payo⁄ pair (d;d), as in the case where
individuals are not concerned about fairness (possess standard, self-interested preferences). Instead,
when players are concerned about fairness, they now experience a disutility from all payo⁄s that
lie away from the main diagonal (unequal payo⁄ vectors), which results in the set of FIR payo⁄s
becoming more compressed around egalitarian payo⁄s. We identify the set of FIR payo⁄s in the
case where players are concerned with fairness, in particular the constraining payo⁄ vectors xi as
illustrated in Figure 5, in the following corollary.
13Figure 5. E⁄ects of higher ￿i on the FIR set.
Corollary 2. In the in￿nitely repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game where individuals have social
preferences, every player i￿ s individually rational payo⁄s (within the set of feasible payo⁄s) must
satisfy xi > xi, where xi ￿ d
1+￿i + ￿i
1+￿ixj for every player i. Additionally, xi is increasing in the
envy parameter, ￿i.
Hence, as individuals become more envious (as ￿i increases), the lower bound of the set of
FIR payo⁄s, xi, shifts (downwards for player 1, x1, and upwards for player 2, x2) shrinking this
set from above and below, respectively ￿ resulting in the shaded area, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Furthermore, increases in players￿guilt aversion ￿i must satisfy the preference assumption that
￿i ￿ ￿i. Thus, higher ￿i will serve to shrink the size of the FIR set, as illustrated in Figure 5. If,
in contrast ￿i;￿i ! 0, Corollary 2 reveals that the FIR set coincides with that illustrated in Figure
3(b) for sel￿sh players, xi = xj = d.
Note the di⁄erent roles played by envy and guilt concerns in the repeated game. On the one
hand, Proposition 1 indicates that the minimal discount factor necessary to support cooperation
in the in￿nitely repeated game decreases with players￿guilt concerns (￿i). On the other hand,
increases in individual￿ s envy concerns (￿i) a⁄ect how egalitarian the payo⁄ distribution in the
repeated game must be, provided that players choose to cooperate in the repeated game, i.e., as
Corollary 2 describes, an increase in ￿i shrinks the set of FIR payo⁄s. Therefore, guilt serves as
a ￿tool￿for supporting cooperation under larger parameter values, whereas envy allows players to
reach more equitable payo⁄s, provided that cooperative behavior can be sustained.
Hence, we can conclude that the set of FIR payo⁄s in the in￿nitely repeated game weakly
shrinks as players become more concerned with fairness. This ￿nding may be contrasted with that
of Abreu et al. (1990), who show, in the context of in￿nitely repeated games in which players are
not concerned about fairness, that the set of FIR payo⁄s weakly expands with increases in players￿
discount factor (i.e., as players assign a higher value to future payo⁄s, the set of FIR payo⁄s that
14can be supported as equilibria of the repeated game expands). Thus our result complements that
of Abreu et al. (1990) by suggesting the existence of an opposing force a⁄ecting the size of the
set of FIR payo⁄s: higher discount factors weakly expand this set, while higher concerns about
fairness serve to shrink the same set. In other words, our results show that the introduction of
considerations about fairness work as a tool to reduce the multiplicity of strategy pro￿les that can
be sustained as perfect equilibria in the in￿nitely repeated game.22
6.1 Patience or fairness? Experimental evidence
The above results suggest that a certain pair of payo⁄s can be sustained with a continuum of
discount factors and concerns about fairness (di⁄erent combinations of ￿i and ￿i). Importantly,
this implies that observed cooperation between players in in￿nitely repeated games could be due to
a mix of these two factors.23 Hence, our results suggest the possibility of some confusion as to which
concern it is that leads players to sustain cooperation over time in repeated game experiments: is
it patience alone (high ￿i values), is it fairness alone (high ￿i values), or is it a combination of the
two?
Our previous results provide a partial answer to this question. In the area in which no overlap
occurs (the unshaded area of FPNF in Figure 5 which does not overlap with FP2, for instance,
and within boundaries x1 and x2), players￿cooperation is sustained because of individuals￿time
preferences alone. However, in the overlapping regions (the shaded area of FPNF coinciding with
that of FP2 in Figure 5), players￿cooperation in repeated games could be supported by combinations
of discount factors and/or concerns about fairness.
Let us relate this theoretical prediction to some experimental data from an inde￿nitely repeated
Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game experiment reported in Du⁄y and Ochs (2009). In Figure 6 we show FIR
payo⁄s for the parameterization of the inde￿nitely repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game that Du⁄y
and Ochs implemented in the laboratory.24 We then add average payo⁄ data (from Du⁄y and
Ochs￿ s ￿xed pairings, inde￿nitely repeated game treatment) so as to compare these realized payo⁄s
with our equilibrium predictions. In this ￿gure we use black dots to represent the average payo⁄s
accruing to ￿xed pairs of subjects over all rounds played in an inde￿nitely repeated Prisoner￿ s
Dilemma game.
22Similarly to the standard literature on repeated games, however, our results still predict multiple strategy pro￿les
being supported in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Nonetheless, our results help eliminate equilibria
where per-period payo⁄s are relatively asymmetric if players are highly concerned about social preferences.
23We suspect that a confound between patience and fairness concerns also exists in ￿nitely repeated games, which
are more frequently studied in the experimental literature.
24Du⁄y and Ochs (2009) parameterize the stage game using a = 20, b = 30, c = 0 and d = 10. These numbers
correspond to payo⁄s in US$ cents per round played. They use a continuation probability, ￿ = :90, to test whether
repeated interaction and learning lead to further cooperation. For details see Du⁄y and Ochs (2009).
15Figure 6
In particular, Figure 6 compares our predictions with respect to observed behavior for the case
where players￿social preferences are moderate, ￿1 = ￿2 = 1
3, labeled FP2. As Figure 6 reveals,
individual subject behavior in the experiment can be explained: (1) by relying on individuals￿time
preferences alone (see the average payo⁄values lying outside the set of shaded FIR payo⁄s in Figure
6 but within the FPNF set); or (2) relying both on individuals￿time and social preferences (payo⁄s
lying within the shaded set of FIR payo⁄s in Figure 6). In particular, we observe that most of the
experimental observations on payo⁄s (64%) lie within this FIR set. Such payo⁄ observations can
be supported using either social or time preferences, or some combination of both. The rest of the
experimental observations, lying outside the FIR set, cannot be sustained using social preferences
alone (or a combination of social and time preferences) but can be supported based on time pref-
erences alone. As concerns about fairness become more extreme, however, the set of FIR payo⁄s
shrinks. As a consequence, more payo⁄ pairs start to lie outside the FIR set of players sustaining
social preferences, but still lie within the FIR set for players who are not concerned about fairness
as represented in Figure 3(b). Hence, such payo⁄outcomes can be rationalized on the basis of time
preferences alone.25
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated how the introduction of social preferences and fairness concerns
may a⁄ect players￿equilibrium behavior in both one-shot and in￿nitely repeated versions of the
Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game. In particular, we analyze how fairness concerns modify players￿incentives
25Note that, as in other experimental tests of in￿nitely repeated games, the game is repeated a ￿nite number of
times and hence players￿observed average payo⁄s can di⁄er from the predicted expected payo⁄s in the in￿nitely
repeated game.
16to cooperate in both versions of the game. In the one-shot stage game, we show that introducing
players who are concerned about fairness might lead to cooperative outcomes in equilibrium, but
only if both players assign a su¢ ciently high value to guilt. We then show that, in the in￿nitely
repeated version of the game, the cooperative outcome can be sustained in equilibrium for lower
discount factors when players are concerned about fairness than when they are not. This ￿nding
is consistent with some experimental evidence from inde￿nitely repeated games where the induced
discount factor is too low to support cooperation under the assumption of rational, self-interested
players.
We then investigate information transmission when players interact in a twice-repeated simulta-
neous prisoner￿ s dilemma game with one-sided asymmetric information about one player￿ s concerns
for fairness. A pooling equilibrium can be supported in which an informed player unconcerned
about fairness initially cooperates in order to mislead his uninformed opponent. Speci￿cally, this
misleading strategy induces the uninformed player to cooperate in the subsequent game, when the
unconcerned player takes the opportunity to defect. This pooling equilibrium might explain in-
cidences of end-game or ￿last-minute￿defections in experimental settings. We also examine the
in￿nitely repeated version of the two-sided incomplete information game, showing that cooperation
becomes more di¢ cult to sustain under incomplete than under complete information.
Finally, our ￿ndings suggest a potential confound in the interpretation of experimental results
showing high levels of cooperative behavior in in￿nitely (inde￿nitely) repeated games, which has
recently become the subject of much study in the experimental literature. First, our ￿ndings can
be used to rationalize observed cooperative behavior in experimental settings with low induced
discount factors where the Folk theorem for repeated games with discounting (under standard
preferences) would predict an absence of cooperative behavior. Second, even in settings where this
Folk theorem applies, we have shown how observed cooperation frequencies may be explained by
time preferences alone or by a combination of time and social preferences. As a ￿rst step toward
disentangling these two e⁄ects, we provide payo⁄ vectors for which cooperation in the repeated
game may only be rationalized using time discounting. Nonetheless, more experimental research
on this topic is clearly needed, in order to clarify this potential confound.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let us ￿rst analyze player i￿ s best response function. If ￿i ￿ b￿a
b￿c then defect is a strictly dominant
strategy for player i. Indeed if player j cooperates, player i prefers to defect since a ￿ b￿￿i(b￿c)
given that ￿i ￿ b￿a
b￿c, and if player j defects player i prefers to defect because c￿￿i(b￿c) < d given
that c￿d
b￿c < 0 ￿ ￿i by de￿nition. If instead ￿i > b￿a
b￿c, then player i￿ s best response to cooperation
is to cooperate since a > b￿￿i(b￿c) for all ￿i > b￿a
b￿c, but his best response to defection is to defect
given that c ￿ ￿i(b ￿ c) < d for all c￿d
b￿c < 0 ￿ ￿i. Thus in this case where ￿i > b￿a
b￿c, player j may
17cooperate with probability q so as to make player i indi⁄erent between cooperating and defecting:
qa + (1 ￿ q)[c ￿ ￿i(b ￿ c)] = q[b ￿ ￿i(b ￿ c)] + (1 ￿ q)d;
which yields q =
d￿c+￿i(b￿c)
a+d￿c￿b+(￿i+￿i)(b￿c) ￿ q(￿i;￿i). In addition, note that the probability cuto⁄
q(￿i;￿i) is positive and smaller than one since ￿i > b￿a
b￿c. Given players￿best responses, if either
￿i ￿ b￿a
b￿c or ￿j ￿ b￿a
b￿c, then the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is (D,D). Otherwise (if
both ￿i > b￿a
b￿c and ￿j > b￿a
b￿c), then both players￿best response to C is C, and both players￿best
response to D is D. Hence, when ￿i;￿j > b￿a
b￿c (C,C) and (D,D) are Nash equilibria of the game
in pure strategies. We now must check for the existence of mixed strategy equilibria. We know
that if ￿i > b￿a
b￿c, then player i is indi⁄erent between selecting C and D if player j randomizes
with probability q = q(￿i;￿i), as described above. By symmetry, there is a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium where player i cooperates with probability q(￿j;￿j) and player j cooperates with
probability q(￿i;￿i). ￿
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a representative period and suppose that both players have cooperated in all prior periods.
If player i deviates to D (the best response to player j choosing C when ￿i < b￿a
b￿c), then player j￿ s
trigger strategy speci￿es the play of D for all future periods following the deviation. Thus in this
case, the deviation by player i in that period yields him the discounted payo⁄ of [b ￿ ￿i(b ￿ c)] +
￿i
1￿￿id:
By contrast, if player i does not deviate in that period, so that both individuals continue
cooperating, player i obtains a discounted payo⁄ of 1
1￿￿ia. Comparing these two payo⁄s, we ￿nd
that the deviation by player i is unpro￿table if and only if ￿i ￿
(b￿a)￿￿i(b￿c)
(b￿d)￿￿i(b￿c) ￿ ￿F
i (￿i) for every
player i. Note that, in the case that players do not assign any value to guilt, ￿i = 0, we have
￿F
i (0) = b￿a
b￿d ￿ ￿NF
i . In addition, ￿F






negative since b > c and a > d. Furthermore, ￿F
i (￿i) > 0 for all ￿i < b￿a
b￿c. We can then express
￿F
i (￿i) as a function of ￿NF
i , as follows:
(b ￿ a) ￿ ￿i(b ￿ c)





￿i(b ￿ c)(d ￿ a)
(b ￿ d)[￿i(b ￿ c) ￿ b + d]
:




(b￿d)[￿i(b￿c)￿b+d] is positive for all ￿i < b￿d
b￿c,
and that ￿F
i (￿i) becomes zero for ￿i ￿ b￿a
b￿c.
Finally, we need to show that a player would choose D forever, once either individual deviated
in an earlier period. In order to prove this, note that if player j deviates, then he would be required
to play D in all future periods. Further, player i￿ s best response to individual j￿ s playing D is
to play D himself (we showed that in lemma 1). Therefore, the trigger strategies de￿ned above
comprise a subgame perfect equilibrium of this in￿nitely repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game. ￿
18Proof of Proposition 2
First note that, if players￿concerns about fairness can be perfectly inferred from their choices during
the ￿rst period of the game, then beginning with the second period, the game is one of complete
information, resembling the one addressed in Proposition 1. In particular, after the ￿rst period of
the game player i either: (1) cooperates regardless of his type if and only if his discount factor ￿i is
su¢ ciently high, i.e., if ￿i ￿ ￿F(￿L
i ) ￿ ￿F(￿H
i ); (2) defects regardless of his type if and only if his
discount factor is su¢ ciently low, i.e., if ￿F(￿L
i ) ￿ ￿F(￿H
i ) > ￿i; or (3) cooperates if his concern for
fairness is high, ￿i ￿ ￿F(￿H
i ), but defects if his concern for fairness is low, ￿i < ￿F(￿L
i ), which occurs
when his discount factor is intermediate, i.e., when ￿F(￿L
i ) > ￿i ￿ ￿F(￿H
i ). In the ￿rst two cases
there is no information transmission from player i￿ s ￿rst-period actions to his opponent (player j),
since all types of player i either cooperate or defect in the continuation game. By contrast, in the
third case, ￿rst period actions may communicate information about the player i￿ s type. We focus
on this case next. (Recall that the envy parameter ￿ and players￿discount factors are common
knowledge among players). Every player i cooperates during the ￿rst period of the game when his
































where qj denotes the probability that ￿j = ￿H
j > b￿a
b￿c, while 1 ￿ qj is the probability of ￿j = ￿L
j <
b￿a
b￿c. Solving for ￿i, we obtain that cooperation can be supported if and only if
￿i ￿ 1 +
(d ￿ a)qj
d ￿ c + qj(b + c ￿ 2d) ￿ (b ￿ c)[qj￿H




If player i￿ s preferences for fairness are low, ￿i = ￿L
i < b￿a
b￿c, defection during the ￿rst stage of the






























which simpli￿es into ￿i < ￿UF
i (￿;￿L
i ), where ￿UF
i (￿;￿L
i ) ￿ ￿UF
i (￿;￿H
i ). Therefore, player i￿ s
discount factor ￿i must satisfy ￿UF
i (￿;￿L
i ) > ￿i ￿ ￿UF
i (￿;￿H






(b ￿ c)(a ￿ d)qj







(b ￿ c)(a ￿ d)(qj ￿ 1)qj
[c ￿ d ￿ qj(b + c ￿ 2d) + (b ￿ c)(qj￿i + (qj ￿ 1)￿)]
2 > 0
19Proof of Proposition 3
Let us ￿rst consider the case in which players do not exhibit social preferences. Assume that there
is an action pro￿le a = (ai;a￿i) with payo⁄ U(a) = x, where x 2 X and xi > e xi for every player
i, and consider the following strategy pro￿le: in period zero each player i plays ai. Each player i
continues to play ai so long as a was played in all previous periods. If at least one player did not
play according to a, then every player i reverts to the minmax action for the rest of the game, with
associated payo⁄ e xi. This strategy pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium of the in￿nitely repeated game for








e xi () ￿i ￿
maxai Ui (a) ￿ xi
maxai Ui (a) ￿ e xi
= ￿NF
i
This strategy pro￿le is subgame perfect, given that, in every subgame o⁄-the-equilibrium
path, the strategies are to play e xi forever, the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Finally,
note that when player i is concerned about fairness, his maximal bene￿t to a deviation from
cooperation, maxai UF
i (a), is weakly lower than that when he is not concerned about fairness,
maxai Ui (a), because of the guilt he experiences from being the player with the highest payo⁄, i.e.,
maxai UF
i (a) ￿ maxai Ui (a), Hence, ￿NF
i ￿ ￿F
i (￿i) is satis￿ed if and only if
maxai Ui (a) ￿ xi
maxai Ui (a) ￿ e xi
￿
maxai UF
i (a) ￿ xF
i
maxai UF
i (a) ￿ e xi
F ;
where we do not impose any assumption on the symmetry of payo⁄s, i.e., allowing for xi 6= xF
i and
e xi 6= e xi
F for any ￿i;￿i > 0. Otherwise, when the payo⁄ structure satis￿es weak symmetry, so that
both xi = xF
i and e xi = e xi
F hold, this implies that the above inequality becomes
maxai Ui (a) ￿ xi
maxai Ui (a) ￿ e xi
￿
maxai UF
i (a) ￿ xi
maxai UF
i (a) ￿ e xi
which can be simpli￿ed to maxai Ui (a)(xi ￿ e xi) ￿ maxai UF
i (a)(xi ￿ e xi), which is satis￿ed for any
parameter values, since maxai Ui (a) ￿ maxai UF
i (a) and xi > e xi. Therefore, ￿NF
i ￿ ￿F
i (￿i). ￿
Proof of Corollary 1
Note that social preferences are introduced in the proof of Proposition 3 by considering that a
player￿ s maximal bene￿t to a deviation from cooperation when he is concerned about fairness,
maxai UF
i (a), is weakly lower than that when he is not concerned about fairness, maxai Ui (a), i.e.,
maxai UF
i (a) ￿ maxai Ui (a). No conditions are assumed about the players￿payo⁄s xi and xF
i , or
about e xi and e xi
F. These assumptions embody both linear and non-linear social preferences. ￿
20Proof of Corollary 2
First, note that the payo⁄ from the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game, d, exceeds
that from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game if and only if ￿i < b￿d
b￿c, which
holds in this section. Payo⁄s pairs (xi;xj) above the reservation utility for player i imply that
xi ￿ ￿i(xi ￿ xj) > d when payo⁄s satisfy xi ￿ xj, imply that xi ￿ ￿i(xj ￿ xi) ￿ d when instead














xj for all i and j, if xi < xj,
respectively. These two lower bounds cross at payo⁄ xj = d; the ￿rst is below the second for
all xj > d, and similarly for player j. Consider the lower bounds for player i. For all xi > d,
the ￿rst bound is below the second, and hence only the second inequality is binding for every
player i. Therefore, the set of individually rational payo⁄s can be de￿ned by xi ￿ d
1+￿i + ￿i
1+￿ixj.
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿i we obtain @xi
@￿i =
xj￿d
(1+￿i)2, which is positive for all xj > d in the
relevant region of the set of FIR payo⁄s. ￿
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